Letters by Richards, Donna
IN MIIUKNINII BETWEEN THE SPECIES 
Paulette Callen 
I saw a muskrat in the park 
Lying at an entrance to her heme 
Oval lIOund of underbelly exposed 
Tiny feet with long shapely nails 
Curled gracefully in death 
Her buck teeth protru:ling slightly 
Between parted lips 
Chestnut hair 
Rustled by the breeze 
Still glistens 
No wounds 
Poison then 
Feeling ill, did she try to make it heme 
and get only this far -- to her doorstep? 
Or, was she underground, and did she 
want to die in the sun? 
LETTERS 
Dear Etlitors: 
I am a new reader of Between the ~ 
cies. The article in the Sunmer, 1986, 
issue by James Nelson, "Xenograft and Partial 
Affections," together with the various re-
sponses, has pranpted this letter. 
It seems that Nelson rests his hypothe-
tical case on a parent's "partial affection" 
for his/her child, implying that parental 
affection is of sum supreme significance 
that virtual IIOral carte blanme may be 
granted in its name. In his "Response," 
Nelson states that "parental affection • 
is surely aIIOng the IIOre IIOrally signifi-
cant." He goes on to say, "Exactly where the 
IOOral force of this kind of partial affection 
cxxnes fran, and exactly how it relates to 
spousal affections, filial affections, and so 
forth, is sanething that requires further 
investigation. " I dare say it requires fur-
ther investigation--especially when Nelson's 
entire xenograft case is built upon viewing 
(continued on p. 18) 
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I have been particularly intrigued with (continued from p. 2) 
the notion of deception. Many species at-
tempt to deceive competitors and predators. 
In nost cases, such deception is not inten-
tional, but it can be very difficult indeed 
to decide what is and is not intentional 
deception. Chimpanzees appear to deceive 
others intentionally. There are also obser-
vations indicating that baboons may indulge 
in intentional deception. But what of the 
broken-wing display of the plover when it 
tries to lure potential predators away from 
its nest? My interest in this issue stems 
from the fact, that it seems that intentional 
deception involves a series of thoughts that 
indicate that you are thinking that I am 
thinking that you intend some specific ac-
tion. This circular reasoning appears to 
indicate that you are self-conscious; that 
is, you are capable of being the object of 
your own thoughts. Intentional deception can 
be studied empirically and distinguished 
(albeit with difficulty) from non-intentional 
deception. Of course, one then still has to 
indicate what moral relevance, if any, such a 
distinction has, but it seems to me that 
mental complexity (or mental capacity) is 
very imp::)rtant in developing a coherent theo-
ry of the noral status of different animals. 
In conclusion, I hope to produce, in the 
not too distant future, something a little 
rrore concrete and satisfying on the nature of 
animal suffering and consciousness and its 
noral implications. One does not need a 
sophisticated noral theory to criticize some 
uses of research anirnals--such as in LD50 
testing or in research that causes easily 
avoidable suffering or death. However, there 
are a lot of research projects that do not 
fall into such categories, and we are just 
beginning to search for a rrorally satisfacto-
ry and consistent public consensus on when 
animal research can be justified. Of Hice, 
Hodels and Hen was intended to help define 
what some of the questions might be. It was 
my first book on this topic but, I hope, not 
my last. 
,"
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Parental affecti.0n solely in an almost sacred 
light. 
I do indeed grant that partial affec-
tions (not just parental) for those close to 
us are brute facts that must be dealt with 
whenever rroral duties are under discussion. 
I suspect that on a hypothetical sinking 
ship, my partial affection would lead me to 
prefer saving my dog, that I personally know 
and love, to saving a human stranger. Why 
are the partial affections of a person for a 
non-human animal automatically dismissed by 
Nelson as obviously less "rrorally worthy" 
than those of a parent for his/her child? (I 
am speaking here of Professor Aiken's chimp.) 
Indeed, the love of a person for a pet animal 
may closely resemble parental love, without, 
however, the ego-supporting "chip off the old 
block" element. 
Toward the end of the xenograft article, 
Nelson mentions !:lis opinion that there is a 
rrorally relevant distinction between animals 
and "marginal" humans, in that "marginal" 
humans have suffered a so-called tragedy in 
"becoming the psychological equals of ani-
mals." A defective human is certainly not, 
as Nelson puts it, the psychological equal of 
a normal, healthy animal--this is a blatantly 
anthropocentric statement. Birth defects are 
a natural occurrence--a deformed or internal-
ly defective puppy is rejected by its rrother 
and dies. This may be sad" but it is no 
tragedy. A human infant may be born with 
many mental and physical defects--why is this 
seen as a tragedy? If the appeal to the 
"tragedy" of so-called "marginal" humans 
automatically places such humans off limits 
for medical exploitation, why is not birth ~ 
an animal in this world considered equally 
tragic? Certainly being granted no rroral 
value whatsoever ought to be tragic enough to 
warrant exemption from torture. 
---~-- Donna Richards 
st. Louis, Hissouri 
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